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Abstract 
 
R&D collaborations have increasingly attracted the attention of both academic and business 
circles in the last couple of decades. Several empirical studies have concentrated on the firms’ 
incentives to participate in these collaborations. This paper presents an alternative approach to 
R&D collaborations using an evolutionary, multi-agent based and sector-level R&D model. The 
model will firstly be used to simulate the evolution of an R&D driven market composed of profit-
driven firms and boundedly rational consumers. Next, frequently discussed research questions in 
the relevant empirical literature will be explored. This modelling exercise will extend beyond a 
basic confirmation/rejection of these research questions by showing that the way a firm is defined 
as an R&D collaborator has a significant effect on research results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms heavily depend on improved products to survive in the competitive markets. A continuous 
introduction of these new products necessitates both specialised and more types of knowledge, 
which is almost always beyond the limits of the accumulated knowledge within the boundaries of 
a single firm. Hence, firms seek outside of the firm to find what they look for, but due to its 
tacitness, knowledge is hard to acquire in the market. Tacitness, of course, inhibits imitation – 
which preserves innovation incentives – but it also prevents a deliberate and intentional market 
based transferring of knowledge (Mowery et al., 1998). That is why firms collaborate in R&D 
partnerships with other firms on a reciprocal basis to share knowledge (Morone & Taylor, 2012). 
R&D partnerships are part of a relatively large and diverse group of inter-firm relationships that 
one finds in between standard market transactions of unrelated companies and integration by 
means of mergers and acquisitions (Hagedoorn, 2002). 
 
Alongside monetary funding, the contribution of an individual firm to a joint venture involves 
sharing of human capital, accumulated knowledge embedded in firm-specific factors, and access 
to information and activities within its own R&D division (which, in most cases, deals with a 
much wider spectrum of projects than the scope of the joint venture). Firms are not merely 
technological entities but are rather complex conglomerations of human capital and knowledge 
accumulated through past learning. Learning and R&D activities are historically path-dependent 
and they generate firm-specific human capital, knowledge, and R&D resources which create 
divergence in knowledge and expertise of different firms, which are often likely to be 
complementary. The factors of production are freely traded in the market but not all of these 
firm-specific resources are available to other firms (Anbarci et al., 2002). Firms form alliances to 
share these resources to boost their R&D productivity with the help of knowledge 
complementarities. In these alliances, technological overlap as a basis of a common technological 
understanding, reciprocity as a prerequisite for knowledge exchange, and the expected value of a 
research cooperation are the major determinants (Cantner & Meder, 2006). 
 
This study explores three research questions frequently studied in research joint venture (RJV) 
literature. These questions are related with the effects of being in a RJV, how competition 
conditions the market share of collaborators and the effect of knowledge heterogeneity on the 
market share of knowledge sharing collaborators. For this purpose, an evolutionary, multi-agent 
based, sector-level innovation model is designed to simulate the dynamics of an R&D driven 
sector. First, this model will be used to analyse the interaction between R&D activities of firms 
and differentiated consumer preferences in structuring the evolution of an industry. Then, we will 
explore our research questions regarding R&D collaborations within this context and the reader 
will observe how one differentiates between collaborators and non-collaborators and how this has 
a significant effect on the answers. 
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An apparent advantage of a simulation analysis in comparison to an empirical one in the context 
of this study is that the observer can effortlessly keep track of all variables of interest and observe 
whether a firm showing the characteristic of being a collaborator is actually in a RJV at a given 
point in time. As will be clear in the following, this discrepancy may have significant 
consequences for the research results. There are also a few advantages of this evolutionary model 
over the ones in the relevant literature. To begin with, it is one of the few models studying RJVs 
with different motives (cost sharing vs. skills sharing) from an agent-based perspective. 
Secondly, whereas most evolutionary models focus on process innovation, this one exclusively 
models product innovation, i.e. technical progress is embodied in products. The third is that firms 
compete both in the R&D process and goods market rather than in any one of them. Lastly, rather 
than single-product firms, the market is populated with multi-product firms which can serve to 
different niches of consumers concurrently. With the continuous introduction of new innovations, 
products transform from undiscovered to discovered and then from cutting edge product to 
obsolete. As the product space steadily shifts, the consumers are compelled to redefine their 
product choices within the given product range. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is a literature review where the research 
questions are also discussed. This part opens with the incentives to engage in RJVs and continues 
with the effect of competition on collaborators’ market share and knowledge sharing incentives in 
R&D collaborations. Section 3 details the simulation model. In section 4, the results of the 
simulation analyses are discussed. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Survey and Research Questions 
 
2.1. Incentives to engage in RJVs 
 
R&D is considered by many observers as one of the, until recently, least expected activities that 
companies would be willing to share with others as it constitutes one of their core competencies. 
Even so inter-firm collaboration has exploded during the past couple of decades, in parallel to the 
intensification of international competition, changing the nature of collaboration from peripheral 
interests to the very core functions of the corporation, and from equity to non-equity forms of 
collaboration. Importantly, cooperation focusing on the generation, exchange, and/or adaptation 
of new technologies has risen at very fast rates. These two facts explain why R&D partnering has 
attracted so much attention during the recent years, both in the academic and in the popular press 
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Calogirou et al., 2003). 
 
Two major strands of theoretical literature can be distinguished in this field. The industrial 
organisation literature has extensively examined the incentives and welfare effects of R&D 
cooperation among competing firms and focused on the role of R&D investments and R&D 
spillovers. Theoretical contributions in the management literature have stressed that R&D 
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collaboration aims at minimising transaction costs and exploiting complementary know-how 
between partner firms (Belderbos et al., 2004). 
 
Cooperative R&D as an arrangement among a group of firms to share the costs and results of an 
R&D project also helps to correct market failures which prevent firms from conducting the 
socially optimum level of R&D. Firms refraining from investing in R&D because of the threat of 
free-riding on the end results are more motivated to innovate if they can find a partner with whom 
to share risks and costs. RJVs can increase the efficiency of the R&D process through economies 
of scale, elimination of duplication of effort, dissemination of knowledge, and utilisation of 
synergies among firms. RJVs also allow firms to undertake costly R&D projects that none would 
undertake alone (Sinha & Cusumano, 1991). Ahuja (2000) asserted that each single partner can 
potentially obtain a greater amount of knowledge than would be the case from a comparable 
research investment made individually (Arvanitis, 2012). Cooperative R&D can be executed in 
many forms, including R&D contracts, R&D consortia, and RJVs (Sakakibara, 1997). 
 
According to Sakakibara (1997), in the economic literature, firms' motives for participating in 
cooperative R&D can be divided into two major classes: reasons related to R&D, and reasons 
unrelated to R&D. The two major R&D-related reasons are enhancing R&D productivity through 
cooperation on R&D inputs and changing the appropriability conditions of R&D outputs (Katz, 
1995; Geroski, 1993). Reasons unrelated to R&D include improved market access through 
partners and the collection of government subsidies. An extensive survey of incentives, strategies, 
and outcomes of RJVs by Caloghirou and Vonortas (2000) revealed the following major 
objectives of firms to join such RJVs: 
 
* Establishment of new relationships 
* Access to complementary resources and skills 
* Technological learning 
* Keeping up with major technological developments 
 
With all their benefits, partnerships have the negative potential to block competition and create 
various kinds of static and dynamic monopolies in existing and future markets, respectively 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). The threat of anti-competitive behaviour increases significantly when 
repeated R&D collaboration occurs between firms that also meet in many product markets 
(Vonortas, 2000). White (1985) suggested that RJVs could reduce the probability of success of 
R&D by reducing the number of research paths explored toward a solution. RJVs can also slow 
down the rate of R&D (Katz, 1986) and delay the realisation of an innovation (Ordover & Willig, 
1985). 
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2.2. The effect of being in a RJV on market share 
 
Sarkar et al. (2001) suggested that the propensity to R&D cooperation (‘alliance proactiveness’) 
will lead to higher levels of economic performance in terms of sale growth, market share and 
product development and that alliances between partners of unequal size mostly provide larger 
firms access to the tacit knowledge of small firms, which in turn benefit from the financial and 
marketing resources of the larger ones (Arvanitis, 2012). Belderbos et al. (2004) found that 
competitor cooperation positively affects growth in sales per employee of products and services 
new to the market and using a combination of objective and subjective measures, Link and Bauer 
(1989) have shown a positive correlation between cooperative R&D conducted by a firm, the 
firm’s market share, and the productivity of the firm’s in-house R&D. Overall, previous 
empirical work appears to suggest a positive impact of R&D cooperation on firm performance 
(Belderbos et al., 2006). Hence our first research question is whether collaborators command a 
higher market share than non-collaborators. 
 
2.3. The effect of competitiveness on RJV 
 
Firms’ proactiveness in R&D collaboration is dependent on the level of market competition. If 
the level of competition is low, they have less incentive to collaborate, since potential gains may 
be offset by the costs and risks involved. Hence, they rely on their internal resources in their 
R&D activities. At a high level of competition, R&D collaboration incentives are impeded by the 
environmental complexity as there is little to be gained from collaboration. Firms facing 
moderate levels of competition are more inclined to cooperate than firms facing low competition 
as they have more to gain from collaboration and they are more attractive partners than firms 
working in a highly competitive environment. Thus, markets with moderate competition may be 
the ones where collaboration is most likely. That is why some empirical studies predict an 
inverted U-shaped relationship for the impact of competitive intensity on the likelihood of 
forming an R&D alliance (Ang, 2008; Wu, 2012; Wu & Pangarkar, 2010). Therefore our next 
question is what kind of a relationship there is between competition level and the market share of 
collaborators. 
 
2.4. Skills Sharing 
 
According to Hamel (1991), firms use alliances as an opportunity to internalise the skills or 
competencies of its partner to create next-generation competencies. Such learning-based 
arguments imply that a key objective of cooperative R&D is complementary knowledge or skill-
sharing among participants (Miotti & Scahwald, 2003). Complementary knowledge here is 
defined as knowledge that, in combination, yields better R&D results by increasing innovative 
productivity (Teece, 1992). Kodama (1992) asserted that 'technology fusion' or the combining of 
existing technologies into hybrid technologies becomes increasingly important for innovation. 
Cooperative R&D is a way to internalise and combine complementary resources and knowledge 
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(Sakakibara, 1997). Analysing over 7000 co-operative agreements worldwide, Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad (1990) reported that complementarity is one of the primary motives for the 
formation of joint ventures and research corporations in information technologies, biotechnology, 
and new materials. 
 
The resource-based view suggests that the degree of heterogeneity in participating firms' 
capabilities is an important determinant of the success of cooperative R&D. Capability 
heterogeneity is defined here as the breadth or diversity of technological capabilities of firms. 
Today's highly sophisticated innovations often depend upon work across several areas of science 
and technology (Hagedoorn, 1993). Few firms have the breadth of knowledge required for such 
undertakings (Randor, 1991), and so a new combination of core competencies is necessary to 
build core competencies (Hagedoorn, 1995; Tyler & Steensma, 1995 as cited in Sakakibara, 
1997, p. 147). Partnerships in which firms have high compatibility in organisational processes 
and partner-specific absorptive capacity allowing for effective transfer of know-how tend to 
outperform partnerships in which overlapping knowledge is narrow (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Mora-
Valentin et al., 2004). Anbarci et al. (2002) also stressed the importance of complementarity 
between cooperating firms’ R&D processes and R&D inputs in RJVs (Belderbos et al., 2006).  
 
There are two conditions that have to be fulfilled for these RJVs to succeed: first, the partners 
require some level of technological overlap to facilitate knowhow exchange. Second, their 
knowledge bases have to be different - otherwise nothing can be learnt (Mowery et al., 1998). 
Hence, optimal learning entails a trade-off between the advantage of increased cognitive distance 
for establishing new linkages and for the emergence of innovations and the disadvantage of less 
mutual understanding (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). If the value of learning is the mathematical 
product of novelty value and understandability, it has an inverse U-shaped relation with cognitive 
distance, with an optimum level that yields maximal value of learning (Wuyts et al., 2005). 
Because firms motivated by knowledge sharing pick their partners according to this criterion, our 
last research question will be whether higher capability heterogeneity among firms will mean 
higher market share of collaborators motivated by knowledge sharing. 
 
As a final point, technological overlap among alliance partners may increase over the course of 
collaboration, as a result of organisational learning and technology transfer within the venture 
(Mowery et al., 1998). Partner firms start to resemble each other in regard to their product 
portfolio and R&D routines after having RJVs experiences together. Whether this common 
history contributes to their prospective joint R&D projects’ success and hence to their tendency 
to work together in the following periods depends on their dynamic cognitive distance. 
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3. The Model 
 
This is an agent-based model, agents being firms and consumers. The agents follow pre-specified 
heuristics (e.g. innovation routines, R&D partnering, product purchases) and react to competitors 
and environmental conditions (e.g. pricing). The interactions between these agents at the micro 
level determine macro outcomes. The model will show how these outcomes are conditioned by 
the parameters of interest. 
 
The model addresses the supply and demand side of the market simultaneously with the 
coevolution of heterogeneous consumer preferences, heterogeneous firm knowledge bases and 
technology levels at the micro level. In line with the evolutionary modelling tradition, we have a 
search algorithm (innovation and imitation of products by firms), a selection algorithm (revealed 
consumer preferences), and a population of objects in which variation is expressed and on which 
selection operates: namely, firms (Windrum, 2007).  
 
The model will show how firms and consumers interact in the market environment and how this 
interaction leads to technological progress. Firms compete on price and quality of their products 
in an oligopolistic market and they engage in innovation or imitation activities to increase their 
quality. Firms are endowed with their fixed innovation strategies. Consumers with heterogeneous 
preferences and constrained by their computational limits act to maximise their utility with their 
product choices shifting their preferences towards higher quality goods as their preferences 
coevolve with technology production by firms. Firms reaching higher quality levels earlier than 
their competitors gain a competitive edge in the market. Demand is differentiated and new 
products create new sub-markets loosely competing with the existing ones.  
 
Firms pick a price for their goods and put them on the market for consumers’ purchase. To make 
their products visible to potential buyers they make some marketing expenses. Consumers sample 
a few products and compare them with their previous experiences to buy one that fits best with 
their preferences. A part of the revenue raised with product sales finances firms’ R&D activities. 
In accordance with its strategy, a firm makes an innovation or imitation to add a new product to 
its portfolio either in an R&D collaboration or on its own. Depending upon their competitive 
performances goods and incumbent firms leave the market leaving their places to new generation 
of goods and newcomer firms, respectively. 
 
3.1. Technology Space 
 
Each product and technology (knowledge) embodied by this product is labelled by an integer 
number. The words “product”, “quality” and “technology” will be used interchangeably in the 
following. A bigger number corresponds to a higher quality product and a better technology. The 
units digit of this number shows the version of the product while the rest of the number shows the 
class the product belongs to. As an example, the number 23 refers to the third version of the 
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second class of products. Hence, each class consists of ten versions. A class is significantly 
different from any other in terms of its technological level whereas there are only incremental 
differences between versions in this regard. Products high on the quality ladder (Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991a; 1991b) -products belonging to higher classes or higher versions within a given 
class- are intrinsically better than the lower ones. The distance between the highest version in a 
given class and lowest version in a consecutive higher class is a parameter of the model and there 
are no defined products in between. Hence the technology space resembles an infinite series of 
quality ladders on top of each other, each ladder stands for a technology class and each step for a 
version, and a move from one class to the next requires a jump between the ladders which is only 
possible with a radical innovation. 
 
3.2. Demand and Supply Structure 
 
Firms compete on quality and price of their differentiated products in an oligopolistic market. 
There are no production quantity constraints on the firms and all demand is satisfied in every 
period, there is no stock accumulation or unsatisfied demand. The production cost of a product is 
linearly related with its quality. Price is initialised as a mark-up over cost and this is the minimum 
price allowed, which means that sales of a product always bring positive profits and ceteris 
paribus higher quality products mean higher profits. Pricing strategy is a dynamic mark-up 
heuristic through which firms decide price of each good every period as a function of quality of 
and profits from that product. Specifically, the proportional change in price is a linear function of 
the proportional change in the profits on that product in the last two periods. The responsiveness 
of price to a change in profit is smoothed by a parameter s . A product with no sales in the last but 
one period is priced at its initial price.  
 
( ) ( )C n mq n   ( 3.1) 
( ) (1 ) ( )p n C n      (3.2)  
( , 1) ( ) ( ( )(( ( , ) ( , 1)) / ( , 1)))p n t p t s p t n t n t n t         (3.3)  
 
where ( ) :C n  cost of product n  
           :m cost multiplier 
          ( ) :q n quality of product n    
          ( ) :ip n initial price of product n  
          : mark-up rate 
          ( , ) :p n t price of product nat time t  
           s : smoothing parameter 
           ( , )n t :profit on product nat time t  
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If a product’s average market share over a specific number of periods is below a threshold level, 
it is deleted from the market. A firm with no products to sell goes bankrupt. Every period a 
constant number of firms enter the market as an exact copy of an already existing firm, except for 
its innovation strategy that is randomly determined. The firms that are copied by the new entrants 
are selected among the ones with a market share below a certain level. This seems a reasonable 
approximation of reality because in practice most firms start small (de Wit, 2005; Dunne et al., 
1988).  
 
Consumers have what we call a memory set which consists of a number of goods selected among 
all the products the consumer considered to buy in the previous periods. This selection is based 
on the utility level the product would bring to the consumer in case of a purchase. At every 
period, the consumer checks whether the products in the memory set are still provided by the 
market. If any of them is removed from the market, it is replaced by a new randomly selected 
product. Again at every period, consumers randomly sample a number of products from 
randomly selected firms. The probability that a product is selected is proportional to the 
marketing expenses by the firm on that product.  
 
A constant share of the last period’s revenue, which is equal for each firm, is spent on marketing 
activities to make goods visible to the consumers and this marketing budget is shared among 
products according to their quality level. Specifically, the visibility of a good is the average of the 
marketing expenses on that good for the last five periods. Price is initialised as a mark-up over 
cost, which is a linear function of quality, and this is the minimum price allowed. Hence higher 
quality products bring higher profits and this is why goods consume a share of marketing budget 
in proportion to their quality. 
 
 The newly selected product is compared with the current minimum utility promising product in 
the memory set and replaces this if it corresponds to a higher utility level for the consumer. Out 
of this dynamically structured memory set, the good that brings the highest utility is chosen to 
buy in every period. There are no income constraints faced by the consumers. This product 
selection heuristic is a decent representation of the basic evolutionary processes of reproduction 
(keeping the highest utility promising products from the previous periods), selection (choosing 
among products to maximise utility), and variation (a continuous and random selection of new 
products). The existence of a memory set and the peculiar way products become visible to the 
consumers enable us to model brand loyalty and advertising effects, respectively (Malerba et al., 
1999). 
 
Utility is a positive function of the quality and a negative function of the price, and the distance 
between product’s profile and idiosyncratic ideal good specific to each customer profile 
(Marengo & Valente, 2010). At the outset, the consumers position themselves within the 
available technology space into consumer profiles or let us say, submarkets. The number of 
submarkets is constant and each submarket corresponds to a point in the technology space 
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between current minimum and maximum quality levels. The total number of consumers is 
uniformly distributed into these submarkets and this relative positioning somewhere between the 
minimum and maximum available technology level in the market is constant through the 
simulation run. Figure 1 exemplifies this distribution. This formulation allows one to model 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences; consumers consist of early adopters with a strong 
preference for high-tech goods, low-price lovers who are content with low quality goods and the 
ones seeking a balance between price and quality. As technology develops (the level of minimum 
and maximum available technology improves), preferences shift towards higher quality products 
increasing the quality of the ideal type good for each consumer. The fact that homogeneous 
consumers are populating submarkets can be interpreted either as there are as many consumers as 
the number of submarkets and each of these consumers is making a group buying every period or 
the submarkets consist of a number of homogenous consumers buying the very same product. 
 
 
Figure 1. A histogram showing the uniform distribution of the customers’ ideal 
product profiles within the available technology space 
 
( , , ) [ { ( ) mod( ( ),10)} mod( ( ),10)] ( , ) | ( ( ) ( , ) |iU n k t r q n q n q n p n t q n q k t                  (3.4) 
min max min( , ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))iq k t q t u k q t q t                                                                                  (3.5) 
 
where ( , , ) :U n k t utility of good n  for customer k  at time t  
            r :radical innovation constant 
           mod( ( ),10)q n : ( )q n mod 10 
           ( , ) :iq k t ideal good profile for consumer k at time t  
           min ( ) :q t minimum quality level at time t 
           max ( )q t :maximum quality level at time t 
 ( ) :u k a random pick from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for each customer at the 
outset 
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The first part of the utility function in the square brackets gives the positive utility derived from 
the quality of the product. This part is separated into two dimensions: the class that the product 
belongs to, as given by the part in the curly brackets, and the version of the product within that 
class which is represented by the unit digit of the product quality number. This separation 
between class and version of a product in utility terms requires us to use modular operation. 
Modular operation finds the remainder of division of one number by another. To give an 
example, A mod B can be thought of as the remainder, on division of A by B. The divisor (B in 
our example) in our case is 10, because there are exactly 10 versions within each class. A 
distinction is made between the class and version of a product since consumers attach different 
levels of values to these dimensions.  
 
Consumers care more about the class of a product rather than its version within a given class. 
This distinction is operationalised by the parameter r . The parameter r is defined as the radical 
innovation constant and determines, ceteris paribus, by how much two consecutive versions in 
different classes differ from each other compared to two consecutive versions in the same class in 
utility terms. To put it another way, r  indicates by how much the first version in a class is 
evaluated better than the last version in a lower class in comparison to one version is evaluated 
better than a one degree lower version in the same class holding all else constant. The higher the 
r the higher is the possibility that higher class products will be preferred over lower class 
products. r  1 presents a special case where there is no more a distinction between the class and 
the version of a product. Under such a circumstance it will take longer for the inferior products to 
be eliminated, product range will increase and technological change and hence wealth creation 
will slow down, since consumers no more put a premium on radical innovations. 
 
The price of a product appears in the utility function with a negative term. The last part of the 
utility function in the absolute terms gives the negative utility due to consuming a non-ideal 
product. This form of the utility function allows one to model heterogeneity in consumer tastes 
with the inclusion of the distance of the candidate product from the ideal one and to model the 
process whereby products transform from non-invented to invented and from cutting-edge to 
obsolete in time with a continuous shift of preferences towards higher quality products as 
explained previously. This process is especially accelerated with an r value higher than 1. 
 
3.3. Innovation and Imitation 
 
Innovation is defined as the emergence of a new product. The firm chooses a product to invest in 
from its portfolio and does R&D. The quality level of this product also shows the knowledge base 
of the firm in that specific project. Innovation size is modelled as a random pick from a Poisson 
distribution with an arrival rate which is a function of the quality of the product invested in and 
the R&D budget devoted to that project (Minniti et al., 2013). The arrival rate is a negative 
function of the quality of the product to invest in: complexity of the product decreases the 
likelihood of the research success. And there are diminishing returns to R&D; additional 
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investments increase the arrival rate in a decreasing manner. Hence, a lower level for the 
complexity of the knowledge base and more R&D investment increases the size of an innovation.  
 
When innovation occurs, the resulting difference (the size of the innovation) is added to the 
chosen product’s technology level. A new product embodying a new technology and a higher 
technology base emerges. If the newly innovated product is in a higher class, then we have a 
radical innovation. Otherwise we have an incremental innovation. Depending on the radical 
innovation constant ( r ) parameter value, radical innovations may render old technologies in the 
market obsolete whereas incremental ones do not have such an impact. Hence a radical 
innovation may disturb the profit stream from the lower-class products which means that a firm 
can cannibalise its own products. This feature is introduced to the model with the specification of 
the utility function whereby higher-class products will have a market stealing effect on the lower-
class products.  
 
In the case of a radical innovation, the size of the innovative step is large enough to cover the 
sum of the distances between the knowledge base and cutting edge technology in the respective 
class and the distance between two consecutive classes where no products are defined. The size 
of an innovative step is limited to a maximum of one radical innovation at a time. When there is a 
radical innovation, the newly innovated product will be allowed at most to be the lowest version 
in the new class and nothing higher. This constraint negates the possibility that the knowledge 
base achieved in the previous class helps explore the technology space of the new class of 
products. If the resulting innovation appears to be in the interval between two classes where no 
products are defined, then the innovation project is assumed to fail.  
 
( , , )( , , )
( )
R n i tn i t
q n

                                                                                                                (3.6)                              
( , , ) ( )n i t Pois                                                                                                                    (3.7)                              
                                                                                                                  (3.8) 
                                                                                       
where ( , , ) :n i t innovation arrival rate for product n  of firm i  at time t 
          ( , , ) :R n i t R&D investment of firm i  in product nat time t  
           : innovation productivity parameter 
           :  innovation size, a random pick from a Poisson distribution with arrival rate   
           ( ) :q n quality level of the innovated product 
 
Imitation is defined as creating an exact copy of another firm’s product. Once the product to 
invest in is chosen within a firm’s own portfolio, the firm determines the expected size of the 
imitative step given its R&D budget and base technology. Then, it searches through the product 
sets of other firms to find this prospective target product. If this product is not innovated yet or 
not extant anymore, the firm seeks for a one step lower technology. If needs be, the firm repeats 
( ) ( )q n q n   
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this search cycle with the next base product. After this search process is over, if no viable 
imitation projects can be determined, idle R&D budget is transferred to the R&D budget of the 
next period. The size of the imitative step is modelled with the same function given for 
innovation projects except for the fact that R&D investment is more productive in imitation than 
in innovation. If imitation succeeds, –the imitative step is at least as large as the distance between 
the base product and the target product- the end result of the project can only be the target 
product itself and nothing else. Even if the imitative step is bigger than the difference in the 
technology levels, the firm will be assumed to achieve the target quality, but no higher.  
 
( , , )( , , )
( )
R n i tn i t
q n

                                                                                                               (3.9)                              
( , , ) ( )n i t Pois                                                                                                                  (3.10)                             
( ) ( )q n q n                                                                                  (3.11)        
                                                                                                               
where ( , , ) :n i t imitation arrival rate for product n  of firm i  at time t 
          ( , , ) :R n i t R&D investment of firm i  in product nat time t  
           :  imitation productivity parameter 
           :  imitation size, a random pick from a Poisson distribution with arrival rate   
           ( ) :q n quality level of the imitated product 
 
A firm is either an innovator or imitator from the beginning and stays as such throughout the 
simulation. Every firm engages in one R&D project at a time and in picking R&D projects, they 
pursue a technology-push strategy. They select R&D projects starting from the highest 
technology base they possess to come up with cutting edge technology possible. The financial 
resources required to imitate a product are lower than to innovate one and the chance of success 
is higher. However, the profits especially from a new-to-the-market innovation are higher 
compared to an imitated product for which the market is already satisfied at least to some degree.  
 
3.4. R&D Productivity 
 
This study defines R&D productivity as the efficiency at which R&D budget is exploited for 
product development projects (parameters and   in equations 3.6 and 3.9, respectively). For 
non-collaborators, this efficiency is the same and constant for all firms. For collaborators, it is 
limited between a maximum and minimum level and its exact value is a function of the difference 
in techniques between partners. For this model, technique can be interpreted as the way of doing 
R&D. Each firm is assigned a random value in one-dimensional technique space when it enters 
the market. There is an inverted U-shape relationship between difference in techniques and R&D 
productivity of the joint R&D project (Figure 2). This kind of a relationship derives from the 
effect of knowledge complementarities on research success. If two firms are very similar in the 
14 
 
way they perform R&D, then there is not much to gain from this partnership. There is not much 
point in tapping into the knowledge base of your partner as it mostly overlaps with yours. If there 
is a radical difference in their R&D techniques, potential knowledge complementarities are 
overshadowed by communication problems. The firms are too different to learn from each other. 
In both cases, R&D productivity can be lower than what it would be if these firms chose not to 
collaborate. The best of both worlds lie somewhere in between: when firms differ enough so that 
there is something to learn from each other, but still they are similar enough so that they can 
share their accumulated knowledge to exploit knowledge complementarities. Therefore R&D 
productivity reaches its peak at a moderate level of difference in techniques. 
 
 
Figure 2. R&D efficiency of a RJV as a function of the difference in    
techniques between firms 
 
3.5 Partnering 
 
Partnerships are only formed for the sake of technology development projects and whether a firm 
collaborates or not depends on its strategy. Firms do not change their strategies throughout the 
simulation. There are collaborator and non-collaborator firms and whereas non-collaborators 
make R&D in isolation, collaborators always find a partner if they can. Any given collaborator 
firm partners with only one firm at a time and two firms should have the same strategy to go into 
a partnership (e.g. knowledge sharing innovators only collaborate with knowledge sharing 
innovators and cost sharing imitators only collaborate with cost sharing imitators). Two firms 
should be planning to invest in the same of class of technology to go into a partnership. This way 
the firms high on the technology ladder are prevented from being exploited by the firms working 
with comparatively inferior technologies. The RJVs are formed for a single R&D project and 
dissolved once the project is over. 
 
Collaborators are divided into two groups according to their motivation for partnering and hence 
the way they choose their partners. Following the stream of evolutionary economists (e.g. Nelson 
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& Winter 1982, Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, & Soete, 1988) the choice of the cooperation 
partner is based on the participating firms’ assets of routines and resources developing over time 
(Cantner & Meder, 2006). The firms motivated with knowledge sharing partner with firms which 
are at optimum distance from them in technique space in order to maximise their R&D 
productivity. The firms motivated by cost sharing partner with firms with the largest possible 
R&D budget. Because technique and R&D budget is a symmetric measure (they do not differ 
according to the perspectives of different firms), a partnership carries the same weight for both 
sides and hence, all partnership offers are accepted. For knowledge motivated firms, in technique 
space, if firm A is at optimum distance from firm B so is firm B from firm A. In a parallel vein 
among cost motivated collaborators, firm A offers partnership to firm B which has the highest 
R&D budget after firm A and this offer is accepted, because firm B cannot get a better offer from 
another firm. 
 
As a final point, firms move toward each other in the one-dimensional technique space when they 
engage in a RJV. Working on the same product development project make firms resemble each 
other in the way they perform R&D. Depending on their relative positions in the technique space 
before the project, this step towards each other either increases or decreases the possibility that 
two knowledge sharing firms collaborate in the following rounds. After several R&D projects 
together, it will be highly unlikely for these two firms to go into a partnership, since there will not 
be much left to learn from each other. This tendency will drive knowledge sharing incumbent 
firms to partner with new entrants in the long term. 
 
3.5. The Pseudo-Code of the Model 
 
At the initialisation period, market is populated with N firms each endowed with a random R&D 
strategy, a random R&D technique and a product portfolio. Also, each consumer is assigned to an 
ideal product profile. The routine for the rest of the simulation is implemented as follows: 
 
1. Firms set a price for their each product as a function of profits from that product in the 
previous periods. 
2. Firms make marketing expenses for their each product as a function of the quality of that 
product. 
3. Each consumer determines her ideal product. 
4. Consumers sample a few random products, structure their memory sets and purchase the best 
product within this set. 
5. Products with an average market share below a threshold level are deleted from the market. 
Firms with no products to sell leave the market. New firms with random strategies enter. 
6. In accordance with their R&D strategies, firms either choose to perform R&D on their own or 
form RJVs. 
7. Each firm and RJV either innovates or imitates. 
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4. Simulation Analysis 
 
4.1. Model Dynamics   
                
In the following we will present the results of the simulation analysis2. The data for the analysis 
is produced as an average over 100 simulation runs of 1000 steps using the base model 
configuration. The only thing that changes from one simulation to the other is the seed value 
which is a number used to initialise the pseudorandom generation process. This seed value 
governs all the stochastic processes within the model and two simulations with the same seed 
value always give the very same results. We start with introducing the evolution of the main 
variables of interest to show how R&D activities of firms and heterogeneous consumer 
preferences interact in structuring the evolution of an industry. 
 
Figure 3 reports inverse Herfindahl index3. The inverse Herfindahl index is the number of firms 
with equal market share that would generate the same concentration as that measured in the 
actual market, consequently measuring the dispersion (or inverse of concentration) of the market 
(Marengo & Valente, 2010). Figure 3 signifies a severe shake-out of firms from the beginning of 
the simulation run until the figure reaches its lowest value when the market concentration is at its 
maximum. This is followed by dispersion where a higher number of firms share the market 
creating a more competitive environment and stabilisation for the following periods. The model 
is initialised with a population of firms and those which cannot successfully serve to 
heterogeneous consumer needs are eliminated from the market in the early periods stabilising the 
concentration rate for the following terms.  
 
 
Figure 3. Inverse Herfindahl Index  
                                                            
2The model was implemented on the Laboratory for Simulation Development platform (Valente, 2008). Software 
and documentation for the platform are available at www.labsimdev.org. The code and configuration file of the 
model is available from the author upon request. 
3 The formal definition of the inverse Herfindahl index is 2
1
1/
n
i
i
s

 where 2is is the squared market share of firms. 
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Figure 4 traces the time-path of the market shares of the groups of firms following one of six 
different strategies: non-collaborator innovators, non-collaborator imitators, knowledge-sharing 
collaborator innovators, knowledge-sharing collaborator imitators, cost-sharing collaborator 
innovators, and cost-sharing collaborator imitators. The figure shows that heterogeneity in firms’ 
innovation strategies is sustainable; every strategy enjoys a positive market share throughout the 
simulation run. Figure 4 also signifies a shake-out of the market shares in the initial periods 
followed by a dispersion and stabilisation for the following terms. 
 
 
Figure 4. Market shares (%) of firm groups following different R&D strategies 
 
Figure 5 allows us to observe the maximum (upper series) and the minimum (lower series) level 
of product qualities available in the market. Whereas the maximum quality level is mainly 
determined by the R&D activities of the firms and the minimum level mainly by the competitive 
forces and heterogeneous consumer tastes, the interaction between demand and supply dynamics 
affects these levels both. The continuous introduction of new products by innovation raises the 
maximum quality and renders low quality products obsolete by shifting consumer preferences 
towards high-tech products. Technological change is the engine of economic growth in this 
model. If for some reason technology creation comes to a halt (e.g. imitators conquer innovators 
dominating the whole market and leaving innovators with no financial resources to innovate), the 
economic growth also stagnates. Therefore both consumers and imitator firms depend upon 
innovator firms to prosper.  
 
Going into an R&D partnership requires firms to have the same R&D strategy and to invest in 
similar technologies. Even if these criteria are met, a possible partner might already be in an 
R&D collaboration. This means at a given time, only some of the potential collaborator firms are 
actually in a RJV. Figure 6 below shows this ratio of the number of active collaborators to 
potential collaborators. The ratio is very high in the initial periods when the firms are quite 
homogeneous in their product portfolios. As product range increases together with technological 
progress, it swiftly decreases and then levels off for the following periods. There are two 
alternative explanations for the fact that not all prospective collaborators are in collaboration at 
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Figure 5. Maximum and minimum quality levels available 
 
every period. Either some of them (roughly 65% for the second half of the simulation run) are 
continuously collaborating whereas others are generally unable to find a partner or most of the 
firms are in collaboration during some part of their life and in isolation for the rest. A closer 
examination of the simulation results shows that the latter is the case. An average potential 
collaborator spends some of its time in R&D collaborations and some for individual projects. 
Then the question arises as to when a firm should be regarded as a collaborator especially in 
collecting macro data. At a given period should a prospective collaborator’s market share add to 
the total market share of collaborators irrespective of whether it is actually in a partnership or not 
at that specific period or should only active collaborators’ market share count? This paper shows 
that the answer to this question determines the outcomes of our research questions.  
 
 
Figure 6. The ratio (%) of active collaborators to potential collaborators 
 
An interesting follow-up question is how this ratio of active to potential collaborators is affected 
by a behavioural rule (R&D intensity) and a structural market characteristic (market size). These 
effects can be observed in Figure 7 for R&D intensity and in Figure 8 for market size. The higher 
the level of R&D intensity and the bigger the market size, the lower this ratio. The explanation 
for this lies in the evolution of product ranges of firms. A higher R&D intensity or a bigger 
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market allows a firm to have an increased product range, which makes it less likely for a potential 
R&D collaborator to find a partner planning to invest in a similar product. 
 
 
Figure 7. The ratio (%) of active collaborators to potential collaborators when R&D 
intensity is low, medium and high 
 
 
Figure 8. The ratio (%) of active collaborators to potential collaborators when market 
size is small, medium and high 
 
4.2. Simulation Experiments 
 
This subsection includes the results of a series of simple simulation experiments designed to 
answer our research questions. The analysis in this section is based on the end of simulation 
values of variables for 100 simulation runs each with a different seed value. At this point the 
reader should be reminded that there are six exclusive strategies: non-collaborator innovators, 
non-collaborator imitators, cost-sharing collaborator innovators, knowledge-sharing collaborator 
innovators, cost-sharing collaborator imitators, and knowledge-sharing collaborator imitators. 
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We start with our first question whether collaborators command a higher market share than non-
collaborators. Being in collaboration involves a trade-off. The R&D efficiency of joint R&D 
projects can be higher (especially for firms motivated by technology sharing) than that of firms 
working in isolation due to knowledge complementarities. Besides, collaborators pool their R&D 
resources to succeed in R&D projects that no other firm can do in isolation. The downside of 
being in collaboration is that they need to share the end result of the R&D projects, which makes 
the partners compete against each other in the same product markets. The distribution of the end 
of simulation value of the market share of collaborator firms is drawn as a box plot in Figure 9 
with two different calculation methods for the very same simulation run. In the first case (active 
collaborators) a firm is regarded to be a collaborator at a given period only if it is in collaboration 
at that specific period. In the second case (potential collaborators) a firm is always regarded as a 
collaborator if it shows the characteristic of being a collaborator by trying to collaborate with a 
partner every period. Therefore potential collaborators include all active collaborators together 
with the firms who failed in partnering although they tried. The mean values for active and 
potential ones are 34% and 56%, respectively. To test our research question one needs to observe 
if the average market share of collaborator firms is significantly higher than 50% and since the 
average market share for active collaborators is way lower than this value, this analysis will be 
performed only for potential collaborators using a one-sided t-test. However the t-test requires the 
sample follow a normal distribution.  To test for the normality of this sample, the Jarque-Bera test 
is performed. The test result shows that the null hypothesis that the sample comes from a normal 
distribution cannot be rejected4. The Lilliefors test also confirms this result. Now that it can be 
safely assumed that our sample comes from a normal distribution, a one-sided t-test can be 
performed. The null hypothesis that the mean is not bigger than 50 is rejected. Hence we can 
argue that on average collaborators command a higher market share than non-collaborators. This 
simulation exercise exemplifies how the way one differentiates between collaborators and non-
collaborators produces opposite results to the very same research question. 
 
 
Figure 9. The market share (%) of active and potential collaborator firms 
 
                                                            
4 All statistical tests in this section are performed at 5% significance level 
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Our second question was what kind of a relationship there is between competition level and 
market share of collaborators. Figure 10 shows how the market share of active collaborators is 
conditioned by the level of competition which is proxied with the number of new entrants every 
period. A closer examination of the simulation data reveals that there is a strong positive and 
linear relationship between the number of entries and the level of competition which is measured 
by the Herfindahl index. The box plot for the distribution of the end of simulation value of the 
market share of collaborators is drawn for the cases when the level of competition is low, 
medium and large with median values of 19%, 33% and 39%, respectively. This figure is a vivid 
example of how competition can increase the efficiency of R&D collaborations through 
economies of scale and elimination of duplication of efforts. Sharing costs and pooling 
knowledge made it possible for the collaborators to undertake costly R&D projects that none 
would undertake alone in a highly competitive environment. A hypothesis test can be performed 
to support this graphical analysis with a statistical one. The normality of the sample distributions 
should be checked first to determine the type of the hypothesis test. The Jarque-Bera test results 
show that when the level of competition is low, the sample does not follow a normal distribution. 
This result is confirmed by the Lilliefors test. Therefore, Wilcoxon rank sum test will be used to 
test the null hypothesis that the samples have equal medians. The hypothesis test results 
complement our graphical analysis; the median value when competition is high is statistically 
significantly higher than the median value when it is medium, which in turn is significantly 
higher than the median value when it is low. Therefore our hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
Figure 10. The market share (%) of active collaborator firms when the level of 
competition is low, medium and high 
 
Repeating this simulation analysis with an alternative approach to collecting data on the market 
share of collaborator firms leads to strikingly diverse results. At this point it should be stated that 
in the previous case at a given moment a firm is regarded as a collaborator only if it participates 
in a RJV at that specific moment. Alternatively, Figure 11 depicts the distribution of the end of 
simulation value of the market share of collaborators when a firm is counted always as a 
collaborator if it engages in R&D partnership activities independent of the outcome which might 
be a success or failure in finding a partner. This is the only difference between these two cases. 
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Competition this time negatively affects collaborator firms. A possible explanation might be the 
negative effect of having to share the fruits of RJVs -turning a research partner directly into a 
competitor- which is emphasised especially when competition is already high due to a high 
number of new entrants every period. The median values are 80%, 56% and 53% when 
competition is low, medium and high, respectively. The normality tests show that when the level 
of competition is low, the sample does not follow a normal distribution which requires one to use 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test to investigate the null hypothesis that the samples have 
equal means. The test results conclude that the median value when competition is high is 
statistically significantly higher than the median value when competition is moderate, which in 
turn is again significantly higher than the median value when competition is low. Therefore, the 
research hypothesis is rejected also using this alternative approach, but this time the direction of 
the relationship between competition and the market share of collaborators is opposite to the 
previous case and this relationship is again statistically significant. This discrepancy in the 
analysis results necessitates a deeper examination of the simulation data. A possible explanation 
may lie in how the ratio of the number of active collaborators to the number of potential ones is 
conditioned by the level of competition. Figure 12 gives this collaboration ratio in time for three 
different levels of competition and it confirms our expectation. The ratio is higher when 
competition is high than when it is medium and it is much higher when it is medium than when it 
is low. This is due to the fact that the level of competition is positively related with the number of 
new entrants each period. When there is a larger pool of potential partners, it is more likely for a 
firm to collaborate with another following the same R&D strategy and planning to invest in a 
similar technology. That collaboration ratio increases in competition explains how potential 
collaborators can lose their market share whereas active collaborators increase theirs as 
competition intensifies. 
 
 
Figure 11. The market share (%) of potential collaborator firms when the level of 
competition is low, medium and high 
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  Figure 12. Collaboration ratio (%) when competition is low, medium and high 
 
In the literature survey it was claimed that the relative importance of the skill-sharing motive in 
R&D consortia increases with heterogeneous capabilities (Sakakibara, 1997). Heterogeneous 
capabilities increase the possibility that two firms joining for an R&D process possess 
complementary knowledge enhancing their innovative productivity. Capability heterogeneity is 
defined here as the breadth or diversity of technological capabilities that firms command. 
Furthermore, Anbarci et al. (2002) claimed that if complementarity is extremely low, RJVs can 
further lead to lower profits and social welfare as well. Figure 13 is drawn to explore these 
claims and shows how the market share of technology motivated active collaborators is affected 
by the overall capability heterogeneity in the firm population. The distributions for the end of 
simulation value of the market share of collaborators motivated with technology sharing are 
given as a box plot when knowledge heterogeneity is low, medium, and high with median values 
of 0.5%, 25%, and 22%, respectively. As suggested by Anbarci et al. (2002), when capability 
heterogeneity and hence technology complementarity is too low, the market is dominated by the 
non-collaborators. Starting from this highly disadvantageous point for the collaborators, they 
increase their market share with an increase in capability heterogeneity. As stated before, this is 
due to the fact that a higher level of heterogeneity makes it more likely for a firm to partner 
another firm which is at optimum distance from itself in the technique space and this boosts 
knowledge complementarity and hence R&D productivity of this alliance over that of a firm 
doing R&D in isolation. Further increases in knowledge heterogeneity do not bring about a 
higher market share for technology collaborators. The reason is that population knowledge 
heterogeneity levels beyond an optimum point do not boost the possibility that any two firms in 
optimum distance from each other in technique space form an alliance. Therefore beyond an 
optimum value, further increases in knowledge heterogeneity do not increase average R&D 
productivity. This graphical analysis should be supplemented with a statistical one. Using 
Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors tests, it is concluded that the samples do not come from normal 
distributions. Hence, Wilcoxon rank sum test is performed to see whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the median values of the samples. The test results show that the 
median value for a low level of knowledge heterogeneity is significantly lower than the median 
24 
 
value for a medium level, which in turn is not statistically significantly different than it is when 
the knowledge heterogeneity is high. These results perfectly support the graphical analysis. 
 
 
Figure 13. The market share (%) of knowledge-sharing active collaborators when 
knowledge heterogeneity is low, medium or high 
 
The effect of knowledge heterogeneity can also be tested for knowledge-sharing potential 
collaborators. A box plot for the distribution of the end of simulation value of the market share 
of knowledge-sharing potential collaborators for different level of knowledge heterogeneity can 
be observed in Figure 14. It is very similar to Figure 13 supporting the argument that knowledge 
heterogeneity does its job on knowledge-sharing active collaborators through its effect on 
knowledge-sharing potential collaborators. This graphical explanation can be confirmed with a 
statistical test. Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors tests show that the samples do not come from normal 
distributions. In order to test whether there is a statistically significant difference between the 
median values of the samples, Wilcoxon rank sum test is used. The results are exactly the same 
as for active collaborators. The median value for a low level of knowledge heterogeneity is 
significantly lower than the median value for a medium level, which in turn is not statistically 
significantly different than it is when the knowledge heterogeneity is high. Hence the graphical 
explanation is statistically confirmed. 
 
For a complete analysis one should also explore collaboration ratio within knowledge-sharing 
potential collaborators as a function of knowledge heterogeneity. Figure 15 below is drawn for 
this purpose. Collaboration ratios take on very similar values for medium and high levels of 
knowledge heterogeneity, which is in congruence with the fact that the market shares of 
knowledge-sharing collaborators are very close at these knowledge heterogeneity levels. 
However a comparatively higher collaboration ratio does not go along with low market shares of 
knowledge-sharing collaborators when knowledge heterogeneity is low. Limited knowledge 
heterogeneity suppresses technological progress and hence product diversification among RJVs 
increasing the likelihood for a potential R&D collaborator to find a partner planning to invest in 
a similar product. Apparently the reason for the low market share of knowledge-sharing active 
collaborators in this case is the low market share of potential collaborators. 
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                     Figure 14. The market share (%) of knowledge-sharing potential collaborators             
when knowledge complementarity is low, medium or high 
 
  Figure 15. Collaboration ratio (%) within knowledge-sharing potential collaborators                
when knowledge complementarity is low, medium or high 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although R&D partnership is the least expected form of collaboration since knowledge creation 
is a core competence of a firm, we have observed acceleration in the number of such partnerships 
in the past few decades. This phenomenon has motivated economists to study the incentives of 
firms to collaborate in R&D and the effects of these collaborations on firms with different 
incentives. This study is a contribution to the discussion of the frequently encountered research 
questions in this literature and to furthering the understanding of the reasons behind the research 
results with the help of an agent-based model. 
 
The agent-based model simulates the working of an R&D driven market with both supply and 
demand side. Firms compete both in goods market and R&D process and consumers act to 
maximise their utility with their product choices that fit their preferences best.  The interaction 
26 
 
between supply and demand results in technological progress that continuously renews 
technology portfolios of firms and product choices of consumers. Firms achieve technological 
progress either via innovation or imitation and either in a RJV or in isolation. 
 
The simulation model used in this study allowed us to draw a distinction between active and 
potential collaborators, which is harder to make in empirical studies. A firm is an active 
collaborator only if it succeeds in forging an alliance whereas it is sufficient to search for a 
partner to be counted as a potential collaborator. The first conclusion of the paper is that active 
R&D collaborators command a lower market share than non-collaborators. In other words, the 
disadvantage of creating your own competitor in the goods market and R&D race by sharing the 
end results of the R&D projects outweighs the advantages of pooling R&D budgets and 
knowledge complementarities on the part of collaborators. An alternative look into this research 
question reveals that the market share of potential collaborators is higher than that of non-
collaborators. Active collaborators command less than half of the market, because not all 
potential RJVs are realised.  The second research question was about the effect of competition on 
the market share of collaborators. Competition increases active collaborators’ market share. 
Working on pooled R&D budgets and exploiting knowledge complementarities creates 
economies of scale and enable collaborators to succeed in huge R&D projects that no firm can 
undertake alone in a highly competitive environment. As opposed to active collaborators, 
potential collaborators are found to lose their market share as competition intensifies. A possible 
explanation is the negative effect of the resemblance of the product portfolios of the firms in a 
RJV, which gets even worse with sharpening competition. These opposite results stem from the 
fact that competition which is driven by the number of new entries every period has a positive 
effect on the ratio of active to potential collaborator firms by increasing the likelihood of 
participating in a RJV. This explains why potential collaborators can lose their market share 
whereas active collaborators increase theirs as competition intensifies. Lastly, technology 
complementarity boosts the market share of active collaborators motivated by knowledge 
sharing. The level of knowledge complementarity is a function of the overall heterogeneity in the 
knowledge pool of firms and there is an optimum level for this heterogeneity beyond which 
further increases do not bring about any increases in the R&D productivity of alliances. This 
result stems from the fact that what determines the success of knowledge complementarities is 
the possibility that two firms at optimum distance from each other in the technique space form an 
alliance and this possibility is conditioned by the level of knowledge heterogeneity in the firm 
population. Knowledge heterogeneity has a very similar effect on potential collaborators and 
collaboration ratio within potential collaborators helps to explain the market share of active 
collaborators specifically when knowledge heterogeneity is moderate or high.  
 
The outcomes of the simulation tests in this study are driven by the chosen method of measuring 
market share of collaborator firms. A clear inference based on these outcomes is that the research 
results of the empirical studies on RJVs should be interpreted with some caution in regard to the 
chosen method of defining collaborator firms. 
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In this paper, firms are endowed with an R&D strategy when they enter the market which they 
are not allowed to change. A possible extension would be the endogenisation of these strategies 
by letting firms freely choose and possibly change them according to varying market and 
technological conditions (e.g. ceasing to go into R&D partnerships once market leadership is 
gained). However one should keep in mind that such a realistic move will increase the 
complexity of the model making the interpretation of the study results even harder. One other 
avenue for improvement is that the one-dimensional technology space of the model can be 
substituted with a multi-dimensional one. This will have implications for knowledge 
complementarities and hence for R&D collaborations. It also remains to see what happens when a 
structural market characteristic (e.g. market size) or a behavioural rule (e.g. R&D intensity, utility 
function) is changed. 
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